Florida International University College of Law

eCollections
Faculty Workshops
2-3-2016

Third Annual Lecture on Legal Education with Jennifer L. Mnookin
of UCLA Law Part II, "Constructing Evidence and Educating Juries:
The Case for Modular, Made-in-Advance Expert Evidence About
Eyewitness Identifications and False Confessions"
Jennifer L. Mnookin
UCLA School of Law, mnookin@law.ucla.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty-workshops
Part of the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Mnookin, Jennifer L., "Third Annual Lecture on Legal Education with Jennifer L. Mnookin of UCLA Law
Part II, "Constructing Evidence and Educating Juries: The Case for Modular, Made-in-Advance Expert
Evidence About Eyewitness Identifications and False Confessions"" (2016). Faculty Workshops.
https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty-workshops/8

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Workshops by an authorized administrator of eCollections. For more information, please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu.

MNOOKIN.TOPRINTER.RESUBMIT2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6/8/2015 11:38 AM

Constructing Evidence and Educating Juries:
The Case for Modular, Made-In-Advance
Expert Evidence About Eyewitness
Identifications and False Confessions
Jennifer L. Mnookin*
Over the last several decades, research psychologists have entered the
courtroom with increasing frequency to testify on behalf of criminal
defendants. Their role has primarily been to show how social-science
evidence complicates the conventional wisdom about certain kinds of
critical and often-used evidence. These witnesses challenge, and sometimes
even debunk, commonsense views about categories of evidence that juries
tend, on the whole, to find very persuasive, like eyewitness identification
testimony and even that so-called “queen of proofs,” the confession.1 These
experts educate judges and juries about the substantial body of research that
shows, for example, that eyewitnesses—even those who have a great deal
of genuine confidence about their own accuracy—are sometimes mistaken
when they identify someone as the perpetrator.2 They teach the fact finders
* David G. Price & Dallas P. Price Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law, and Faculty Director,
Program on Understanding Law, Science, and Evidence (PULSE@UCLA Law). Many thanks to
Wendy Wagner and the other participants in the Texas Law Review “Science Challenges for Law
and Policy” Symposium for helpful conversation and discussion, as well as to the student
members of the Texas Law Review for superb organization. Particular thanks to Joe Cecil for
excellent comments and suggestions about this project, both at the symposium and more
generally. Thanks also to Joshua Dienstag, Jennifer Friedman, Richard Leo, Deb Tuerkheimer,
and participants in the faculty colloquium at Northwestern for helpful conversations and feedback.
Many thanks as well to Jaci Seelagy for excellent research assistance.
1. As John Langbein wrote, “[t]he maxim of the medieval Glossators . . . aptly describes
American law: confessio est regina probationum, confession is the queen of proof.” John H.
Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 14 (1978).
2. The psychological literature on eyewitness identification is voluminous. For a recent effort
to canvas and evaluate the field, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS.,
IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 108 (2014) [hereinafter
IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT], noting that “self-reported confidence at the time of trial is not a
reliable predictor of eyewitness accuracy.” For other overviews of the social-science findings in
the area, see generally BRIAN L. CUTLER & MARGARET BULL KOVERA, EVALUATING
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2010), identifying best practices for evaluating eyewitness
testimony and guidelines for interactions between attorneys and expert witnesses; BRIAN L.
CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY,
AND THE LAW (1995), evaluating the effectiveness of mechanisms meant to safeguard defendants
from faulty eyewitness testimony by reviewing empirical research, finding that official safeguards
are less effective than expert psychological testimony educating jurors on the frailties of
eyewitness memory; JAMES MICHAEL LAMPINEN, JEFFREY S. NEUSCHATZ & ANDREW D. CLING,
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2012), chronicling the variables that impact
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that memory operates not at all like a point-and-shoot camera; rather,
honestly held beliefs about what a witness claims to have seen or
experienced may be distorted, inaccurate, or even completely wrong.3 They
describe the dangers of certain lineup procedures that may increase the
chances that a witness makes an erroneous identification.4 They describe
the reality, surprising to many, that innocent suspects under interrogation by
the police sometimes really do confess to crimes in which they actually
played no role at all.5
The judicial reception of these forms of psychological evidence has
been stuttering and somewhat rocky, but overall it is fair to say that there is
growing acceptance of the legitimacy of these kinds of expertise. In fact, a
number of courts have held that when an eyewitness identification by a
stranger is at the heart of the prosecutor’s case, the trial court’s exclusion of
a qualified defense expert who could have educated the jury about relevant
social-science findings about the danger of mistaken identifications can
even be reversible error.6 Courts in recent years have shown increasing
the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and describing the beneficial effects of expert testimony
offered to educate juries about questionable eyewitness statements; and ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS,
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979), creating a framework that examines empirical studies relating to
eyewitness testimony and explaining how eyewitness testimony has impacted the American legal
system.
3. See, e.g., IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 2, at 69–70 (concluding that “[m]emory is
often far from a faithful record of what was perceived, . . . its contents can be forgotten or
contaminated at multiple stages, it can be biased by the very practices designed to elicit recall, and
it is heavily swayed by emotional states”). See generally sources cited supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting the
inherently suggestive nature of lineup procedures that can induce witnesses to make unreliable
identifications); IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 2, at 106–07 (recommending the use of
double-blind methods in lineups and photo arrays to avoid bias inadvertently suggested by the
administrator).
5. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 7–8, 14–44 (2011) (discussing expert testimony in the context of false
confessions and explaining that some 16% of exonerees studied gave false confessions in response
to police interrogation, often even incorporating details of the crime likely provided to them by the
police); G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Introduction: Police Interrogations and False Confessions—An
Overview, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH,
PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 3, 4–5 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner
eds., 2010) (summarizing studies indicating that common procedural errors of interrogations can
result in false confessions); DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PROCESS 121 (2012) (noting that false confessions “have been observed in 15–25 percent
of the known exonerations”); Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False
Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 933–43 (2004) (presenting a collection
of examples of interrogation-induced false confessions, including an extensive list of specific,
proven false confessions).
6. For one of the earliest such cases, see State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1223–24 (Ariz.
1983). Other cases finding exclusion to be error (often depending on quite fact-specific
dimensions of the case, such as the centrality of the identification to the prosecution’s case
coupled with little corroborating evidence or the existence of a cross-racial identification) include
Brownlee, 454 F.3d at 144; People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1984); State v. Guilbert,
49 A.3d 705, 729 (Conn. 2012); Benn v. United States, 978 A.2d. 1257, 1275 (D.C. 2009);
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concern and interest in the problem of unduly suggestive lineup procedures
as well.7 For false-confession evidence, the trend line remains somewhat
more uneven; while some courts do continue to exclude the evidence, often
on the grounds that it is unnecessary or invades the province of the jury (by
indirectly opining on credibility), many others do permit such expertise.8
The recent increased focus on and knowledge about wrongful
convictions have spotlighted the importance of these kinds of psychological
evidence. The rise of DNA evidence and the concomitant Innocence
Movement have exposed the significant dangers of erroneous eyewitness
identifications and false confessions, among other kinds of evidence. In a
close look at the first several hundred DNA exonerations, Brandon Garrett
found that around three-quarters of the cases involved some form of
mistaken eyewitness identification.9 False confessions were less commonplace but still far from rare, appearing in nearly one-sixth of the cases he
examined.10
This prevalence of mistaken eyewitness identifications and false
confessions among known wrongful convictions strongly suggests that fact
finders sometimes risk overvaluing or misinterpreting these kinds of
evidence. By educating the jury about social-science research, expert psychological evidence may give the jury better tools for assessing probative
value more accurately. Teaching about risk factors for erroneous identification or mistaken confession may enable savvier assessment of these
kinds of proof in the particular case—and helping fact finders to assess
these kinds of evidence with an informed, critical eye may even help reduce
wrongful convictions.
That said, expert psychological evidence is only one possible method
among several for attempting to reduce wrongful convictions based on
erroneous eyewitness identification or inaccurate and false confessions.
Moreover, realistically it is simply not an approach that can feasibly be used
in the very large number of cases in which these forms of evidence play a
starring role. Experts are simply too few in number and too expensive to be
able to be called in as many cases as they would have meaningful relevance.
Given their cost and scarcity, psychological experts are inevitably going to
be a “couture” approach to evidence, available only when either a defendant
Stephenson v. State, 226 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, no pet.); and State v.
Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1115 (Utah 2009).
7. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 897–902 (N.J. 2011) (discussing various lineup
procedures); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 686–88 (Or. 2012) (en banc) (same).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1246 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that trial
judge acted within his discretion in disallowing expert testimony); Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d
763, 773–74 (Ind. 2002) (holding exclusion of expert testimony to be reversible error).
9. See GARRETT, supra note 5, at 48 (reporting eyewitness misidentifications in 190 of 250
cases).
10. Id. at 18 (noting false confessions in 40 out of 250 cases). See also SIMON, supra note 5,
at 121 (noting multiple cases and studies documenting instances of false confessions).
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has means or a judge can be persuaded to provide funding for this
purpose.11 This individualized, custom, haute couture approach cannot in
its current form be transformed into a ready-to-wear alternative that could
be used in the great mass of cases; by its nature, it does not easily scale.
In this Article, I want to suggest a method by which we could, in fact,
transform this couture approach into a ready-to-wear alternative, accessible
by far more defendants for very little cost. Specifically, I want to argue that
a credible, nonpartisan, well-respected organization (or multiple organizations partnering together) should spearhead and oversee the creation of
premade, canned, modular testimony on these topics. These made-inadvance modules could, at the defendant’s election, be introduced as a form
of testimony to teach a fact finder about what research psychology shows
about relevant aspects of eyewitness identification, or the operation of
memory, or lineup procedures, or false confessions.
Such an approach is, I admit, unusual. Testimony in our adjudicatory
system is typically understood as something case specific, as an individual
testifying live and in person, face-to-face before a fact finder. I am instead
proposing a kind of testimony that would be produced in advance of any
given trial and that could be used and reused whenever appropriate in the
many different trials in which the same social-science related issues recur.
I first suggested the possibility of this kind of “repeat-play” modular
testimony in a forthcoming piece in a symposium in honor of the great—
and often maverick—trial judge Jack Weinstein.12 In that article, I put
forward the idea of modular testimony for certain, limited kinds of expert
evidence as one of two possible evidentiary innovations I proposed that
linked to aggregation, technology, and justice.13 In that piece, I presented
an overview of both ideas as “‘objects to think with’; as ideas to spark our
collective evidentiary imagination and encourage us to think expansively
about how we might improve the quality of information to which juries
have access . . . in the interest of enhancing the fairness and accuracy of our
adversarial process.”14
In this Article, I want to compare this idea of modular testimony to
several alternative methods for trying to reduce the dangers of inaccurate
11. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 72, 86–87 (1985) (determining that a defendant
has a due process right to the assistance of a psychiatrist for the determination of sanity but
leaving open the extent to which this due process right requires courts to fund other kinds of
expert assistance helpful to mounting a defense). In practice, there is a great deal of judicial
discretion regarding the funding of experts for indigent defendants. See Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v.
Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1305, 1312–13 (2004) (noting that judges have the ability to restrict or deny funding for
defense experts).
12. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Repeat-Play Evidence: Jack Weinstein, “Pedagogical Devices,”
Technology, and Evidence, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
13. Id.
14. Id. (citations omitted).
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eyewitness identifications and false confessions. Specifically, I will look at
the possibility of having judges assess the reliability of these kinds of
evidence directly, and I will also assess the viability of using expanded jury
instructions as an educational device. I will argue that modular, repeat-play
evidence is conceptually preferable to jury instructions and more
institutionally appropriate than a strong version of a substantive reliability
assessment by the court. On the question of whether modular, made-inadvance expert testimony it is a better approach than using a traditional
expert witness, I am more equivocal. There are both gains and potential
losses to replacing a live expert with a set of prerecorded modules—but
realistically, the use of live expert witnesses in these cases is, like the
bespoke suit, a rarity. Therefore, at a minimum, modular testimony offers a
potential second-best solution that would permit the content of expert
testimony to be used in a far larger number of cases in which they are
relevant.
As we shall see, the current doctrines for the judicial evaluation of
these kinds of evidence invoke reliability considerations around the edges,
but in fact hardly regulate them at all. By contrast, for scientific and expert
evidence Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.15 and its progeny
have required judges to play an active gatekeeping role, assessing validity
and reliability in order to determine admissibility.16 Some have suggested a
similar gatekeeping role for judges vis-à-vis these other kinds of evidence
as well. I will suggest, however, that judges usually do not in fact have a
legitimate basis for determining reliability in a given instance; while we do
have significant social-science knowledge about these areas, that
knowledge does not translate into a validated method for diagnosing the
accuracy of a particular identification or confession.
Jury instructions offer another alternative for reducing the dangers of
eyewitness misidentification or wrongful confessions. In fact, several
jurisdictions, most notably New Jersey, have invested substantial energy in
the production of social-science-based jury instructions, particularly about
the social-science research on eyewitness identifications, to be used as a far
lower cost alternative to experts in appropriate cases. But this use of
instructions, while an understandable and well-intentioned response to the
importance of the issue and the practical reality that not every deserving
defendant will be able to call an expert, is, I suggest, a wrong turn. They
are, in a way, a category mistake: an effort to turn something that is
fundamentally evidence into an appropriate topic for judicial instruction.
This category mistake, however, does reflect something important and
relatively unusual about these kinds of evidence. At least a significant
15. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
16. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136 (1997).
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part—and perhaps virtually all—of the value offered by these kinds of
experts is simply not case specific. These social-science experts are
describing the state of a field, the findings of experiments, and what is
known and understood about circumstances or risk factors that make, for
example, faulty identifications or false confessions more likely.17 It is this
quality—which we could call “framework” evidence,18 or meta-expertise,19
or instructional or educational expertise,20 or even legislative facts21—that
makes jury instructions a tempting, if problematic, direction in which to
head. And it is precisely this same quality that makes modular, premade
testimony a plausible alternative to our traditional, particularized, case-bycase use of an expert.
In what follows, my main focus is on psychological experts on
eyewitness identification, though I also discuss false-confession evidence as
well, albeit to a lesser extent. However, the modular, repeat-play approach
could plausibly be used in other settings as well. This approach could make
sense in any area in which (1) the same social-science or empirical issues
arise in largely the same form over a broad array of cases, or (2) the core
contributions of the expert to the trial are at the “meta” or “framework”
level rather than in assessing particularized dimensions of the specific facts
and their implications. For example, another fruitful area for modular
testimony might be the scientific reliability of certain forms of forensic
science. Currently, experts do occasionally testify on the extent of
scientific research in fingerprint, firearms, bite mark, or handwriting
identification.22 These testifying experts are often not themselves forensic
17. See generally Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of
Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987) (describing the rise of social frameworks as an
alternative to the rigid distinction between social science being used to prove legislative or
adjudicative facts and proposing ways to incorporate the general findings of such research into the
adjudicative process).
18. Id. at 568, 598.
19. See Simon A. Cole, Out of the Daubert Fire and into the Fryeing Pan? Self-Validation,
Meta-Expertise and the Admissibility of Latent Print Evidence in Frye Jurisdictions, 9 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 453, 456–57 (highlighting that, when courts must evaluate the validity of claims
where the appropriate reference community is not obvious, courts must turn to “meta-experts”
who have evaluated the empirical and rational validity of those claims); Jennifer L. Mnookin,
Atomism, Holism, and the Judicial Assessment of Evidence, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1524, 1577–78
(2013) (discussing the widespread practice of scientific experts using meta-analytic techniques to
aggregate evidence and data in their own domain).
20. See Samuel R. Gross & Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Information and Expert Evidence: A
Preliminary Taxonomy, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 141, 163 (2003) (defining “instruction” as
“general information about some common issue or phenomenon . . . rather than specific
information about a particular problem or case”).
21. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 952 (1955) (explaining
the general nature of legislative facts).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1101–03 (D. Alaska 2001)
(describing a nonforensic practitioner’s testimony regarding the lack of scientific research for
handwriting identification); Michael J. Saks, Banishing Ipse Dixit: The Impact of Kumho Tire on
Forensic Identification Science, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879, 897–99 (2000) (describing cases
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practitioners of the discipline upon which they are commenting, and they
typically do not offer any specific conclusion about whether the
fingerprints, bullets, bite marks, or handwriting specimens actually match.23
As with testimony by research psychologists, in many cases in which such
forensic science meta-expertise would be helpful no one is called to testify,
sometimes for lack of funds, often for lack of know-how (and sometimes
because some courts have resisted permitting it).24
Although my focus is criminal trials, where resource differentials are
most acute and our methods for managing them less developed, there are
many uses of framework testimony in civil cases as well, and it might be
possible for modular, made-in-advance testimony to be used on the civil
side as well.25
This Article proceeds as follows. The next Part describes this idea of
modular testimony in slightly more detail. The following Part then turns to
issues relating to judicial evaluation of the reliability of eyewitness
identification evidence and confessions, beginning with a brief historical
overview that shows the lack of judicial focus on the substantive reliability
of these kinds of proof. I suggest that this lack of direct focus on reliability
may be one factor contributing to the rise of expert evidence in these areas;
if concerns about the design of a lineup or flaws in an identification
procedure or interrogation rarely lead to its outright exclusion, these same

where expert testimony was offered regarding the extent of scientific research for identification
evidence).
23. See, e.g., Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1101–03 (experts testified before the court as to the
reliability of handwriting analysis generally, rather than in reference to the specific facts of the
case).
24. See, e.g., In re Castro, Nos. H036045, H034813, 2012 WL 271339, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App.
2012) (discussing defense counsel’s failure to hire a handwriting expert); Howard v. State, 945 So.
2d 326, 334 (Miss. 2006) (describing defense counsel’s failure to obtain funds for a bite mark
expert); State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Utah 2009) (noting the trial court’s refusal to
allow an eyewitness expert’s testimony). Note that I have on rare occasions testified about the
scientific foundation (and limits to that foundation) for fingerprint evidence and in one case was
excluded from court because I was not myself a fingerprint expert.
25. See U.S. Courts, The Patent Process: An Overview for Jurors, YOUTUBE (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ax7QHQTbKQE&list=PL4bcxoLSIaXeVdyUI1500VSrfuKyI
XLfJ&index=2, archived at https://perma.cc/HL3Q-T357 (an effort by the Federal Judicial Center
to produce a video explaining the patent process to jurors in a nonpartisan, balanced manner, for
Federal District Courts to use to educate jurors during patent trials). Although this made-inadvance video presentation is not precisely an example of the kind of modular testimony that I am
suggesting in this Article, it nonetheless deserves our notice, particularly because it represents an
effort by a nonpartisan organization to create a fair depiction of a set of issues that are “repeat
play,” in the sense that they frequently arise in nearly identical form in different cases. However
this patent video is, in important ways, quite different from what I am proposing because the
patent video is an introductory lecture, not testimony—there is no direct or cross-examination by
lawyers, nor are the topics discussed based on social science research. Notwithstanding these
important differences, this patent video is an interesting example of an effort to gain efficiencies—
and increased fairness—via technology. Many thanks to Joe Cecil for drawing my attention to
this video.
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concerns provide part of the justification for permitting expert testimony—
but expert testimony, I suggest, cannot possibly be used as a practical
matter in all of the cases in which it might be helpful. In the following Part,
I therefore look at two already-established alternatives to expert evidence:
judicial gatekeeping, in the form of a more serious examination of
reliability, and jury instructions designed to teach jurors about the social
science in this area. I suggest that a more robust reliability screen for these
kinds of evidence, while superficially appealing, is unlikely to be highly
accurate in evaluating correct and incorrect identifications or in
distinguishing true from false confessions, and therefore raises significant
institutional concerns about the boundary between the role of the judge and
that of the fact finder. As for jury instructions in this area, I argue that this
approach conflates instruction with evidence in troubling ways and
inevitably fail to provide nuanced information about relevant social science
(or its limits). Then, in the final Part, I return to modular testimony and
address briefly how it compares to traditional expert evidence. I suggest
that modular testimony invites us to ask directly whether we think experts
in these areas ought ever to be able to testify in a case-specific,
particularized way, or should be limited to a description of the general
research. If the latter, modular testimony’s made-in-advance, non-casespecific format becomes a feature rather than a bug, because it structurally
prevents experts from commenting on how the social science bears on the
particular case—after all, the testifying experts aren’t even in the
courtroom. If, however, it is sometimes appropriate for an expert to engage
more particularistically, then it is a downside of modular testimony that
such particularistic engagement is not available. Nonetheless, given the
high cost of live experts, on the one hand, and the limited effectiveness of
both reliability assessments and jury instructions, on the other hand, I argue
that modular testimony is, at a minimum, a second-best solution worth a try.
I.

Modular, Repeat-Play Testimony: An Introduction

My core idea is quite simple: courts should permit defendants to make
use of made-in-advance “modules” in which psychological experts provide
testimony about key aspects of eyewitness identification and falseconfession evidence. These modules would be structured like regular
testimony in that they would include both direct examination and crossexamination and, like regular testimony, they would proceed in the question
and answer format to which we are accustomed.
When I describe the testimony as modular, I mean to suggest it should
consist of a variety of distinct subparts in both the direct and crossexamination portions, each of which corresponds to a particular topic that
frequently arises within trials in which expert testimony of these sorts is
used (e.g., a discussion of the research on cross-racial identification could
be one module, while discussion of the research on weapons focus, or the
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relationship between confidence and accuracy of an identification, or the
relationship between observation time and accuracy could be others). Each
module should to the greatest possible degree be substantively selfcontained so that a defendant could separate them and make use of only the
ones that bore on the issues in the specific case.
For this idea to be effective and successful, the experts who participate
in this project would need to be some of the best regarded leading experts in
the field. The lawyers who participate—on both the “defense” side and for
the “prosecution,” though I use those terms in scare quotes because the
lawyers would not in fact be representing a specific client as they
questioned the expert—should also be of the highest caliber with extensive
experience in precisely these areas and themselves extremely
knowledgeable about the social science. All the participants should be
compensated appropriately for their time and energy in producing the
modules. Nor should the use of these modules—which would, as I already
indicated, include cross-examination—subject the experts to being
subpoenaed by the prosecution in any case in which the module was used,
though if the prosecutor wished to call a live rebuttal witness, nothing about
the existence of modules ought to prevent her from doing so.
For this idea to be workable, the modules would need to be produced
by a well-regarded, structurally neutral organization, not affiliated with
either the defense bar or the prosecutors. It might also be possible for the
content of the modules to be vetted or assessed by experts to provide a form
of peer review to assess its fundamental fairness and legitimacy.
My basic claim is that this form of modular evidence deserves to be a
tool in our trial toolbox. Many, indeed most, courts are willing to permit
experts to testify on eyewitness identification issues, and a growing number
are permitting false-confession experts as well. Given the framework
nature of this evidence and the basic reality that most of what an expert
testifies to will not be—and quite likely should not be—case specific, why
do we continue to hew to the idea that the evidence must be produced in an
individualized, case-specific manner?
Permitting modular expert evidence will require some creativity on the
part of judges and an openness to innovation, and it is quite possible that it
will be loudly opposed by both prosecutors and defense counsel alike. But
given the simple reality that expert witnesses are unlikely to be available in
the vast majority of cases in which they would be useful, it seems
worthwhile to be open to efforts to create wholesale rather than retail
methods of engagement about these social science findings. Indeed, the
turn in some states to increasingly detailed and science-based jury
instructions represents precisely such an effort—but I contend that modular
testimony in fact is more institutionally appropriate than science-based
instructions. Similarly, modular testimony may also be more respectful of
the appropriate roles for judge and jury than a direct judicial effort to assess

MNOOKIN.TOPRINTER.RESUBMIT2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1820

Texas Law Review

6/8/2015 11:38 AM

[Vol. 93:1811

the reliability of confessions or eyewitness identifications. We turn now to
look briefly at how the courts currently think about reliability, with respect
to eyewitness identification and confessions in turn.
II.

Judicial Assessments of Reliability

A.

The Brathwaite Test for Assessing the Reliability of an Eyewitness
Identification

It is perhaps stating the obvious to say that we would like to make use
of eyewitness identifications and confessions in court whenever they are
likely to be adequately reliable. While not technically a corollary, it seems
equally reasonable to say that when confessions or eyewitness identifications are very likely to be unreliable, we ought not to permit them as
evidence (unless we have confidence that the fact finder can do its own
reasonably accurate assessment of the evidence’s reliability).
However, for both eyewitness identifications and confessions, it is far
from clear that our current doctrinal tests for admissibility map onto
reliability and validity in any meaningful way. In 1977, the Supreme Court
in Manson v. Brathwaite26 laid out the test that is largely still used today in
federal courts and in most states for determining when, if ever, due process
mandates exclusion of eyewitness identification.27 An undercover policeman made a narcotics purchase and shortly afterwards described the seller
to two fellow officers.28 The undercover agent was shown a single
photograph of a possible suspect, a method of identification known as a
“showup,” and identified him as the seller.29 Based on this identification,
the suspect was charged with possession and sale of heroin.30 Subsequently
at trial, this photograph from the showup was introduced into evidence, and
the narcotics agent on the stand made a positive, in-court identification of
the defendant (who claimed to have been ill at home, elsewhere, all day on
the date in question).31 Almost entirely on the basis of these identifications,
the defendant was convicted of both counts.32 The defendant appealed,
arguing that the identification procedure—a single photograph, rather than a

26. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
27. This case built on earlier jurisprudence about eyewitness evidence, police conduct, and
suggestibility. See, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 195–96 (1972) (raising the issue of
whether the victim’s identification of the respondent in a lineup violated due process); Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (acknowledging that while “[t]he practice of showing suspects
singly to persons for the purpose of identification . . . has been widely condemned[,]” the totality
of the circumstances in the record did not suggest due process had been violated).
28. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 99–101.
29. Id. at 101.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 102.
32. Id.
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lineup or any kind of comparison to others—was unnecessarily suggestive
and violated his due process rights.33 Although the court of appeals agreed
with the defendant,34 the Supreme Court did not.35 While asserting that
“reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification
testimony[,]” the Court also found that due process required protecting this
“evidentiary interest” only to a “limited extent.”36 Identifications ought to
be excluded, the Court said, only when there is “a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification”37—note, particularly, the double
modifier, not merely a substantial likelihood, but a very substantial
likelihood—and “[s]hort of that point, such evidence is for the jury to
weigh.”38 The Court continued: “We are content to rely upon the good
sense and judgment of American juries, for evidence with some element of
untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are not so
susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of
identification testimony that has some questionable feature.”39
The Court asserted, in essence, that eyewitness identifications should
be admissible unless they are extremely likely to be wrong, largely because
of its faith in the jury’s good sense as a mechanism for separating the valid
from the mistaken.40 Brathwaite laid out factors courts should examine
when considering the “totality of the circumstances”41 to determine the
procedural adequacy of an identification:
These include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at
the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy
of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the
confrontation. Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting
effect of the suggestive identification itself.42
Finally, the Court found that defects—like the fact that the officer
made the identification based on a single photo—most often go to weight
rather than admissibility.43 Thus, under Brathwaite, even identifications
that are the result of highly suggestive identification procedures may be

33. Id. at 103.
34. Brathwaite v. Manson, 527 F.2d 363, 372 (2d Cir. 1975).
35. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 117.
36. Id. at 113–14 (emphasis omitted).
37. Id. at 116 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 113 (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
42. Id. at 114.
43. Id. at 117.
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introduced in court, so long as the court’s estimation of the totality of the
circumstances does not suggest a very substantial likelihood that the
identification is wrong.
There are two points worth emphasizing. First, by the Court’s own
acknowledgement, and indeed by design, it takes a lax and limited approach
to the scrutiny of eyewitness identifications.44 A court’s purpose is not to
assure that they are valid, nor even strongly to incentivize lineup procedures
designed to maximize reliability. Rather, a court’s inquiry is meant to offer
a limited last-ditch check on egregiously unreliable identifications—and,
even then, only if the unreliability is produced by some improper action of
the state vis-à-vis the identification process.45 In recent years, the Court has
continued to embrace this approach, explaining in Perry v. New
Hampshire46 in 2012 that “[t]he fallibility of eyewitness evidence does not,
without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant a due process rule
requiring a trial court to screen such evidence for reliability before allowing
the jury to assess its creditworthiness.”47
Second, the characteristics suggested by the Court as deserving
analysis may indeed be common sense, but that does not make them
especially useful at reliably distinguishing valid from invalid
identifications. It turns out that several of them—perhaps most notably the
level of certainty expressed in court at the time of confrontation—do not,
according to social science research, bear significantly on accuracy in most
circumstances and may themselves be matters about which witnesses can be
highly suggestible.48 More pointedly: a little police nudging can go a long
way toward increasing witness confidence, and according to the research,
the relationship between well-after-the-fact confidence level and accuracy is
basically nonexistent.49
Moreover, like any qualitative, multifactor

44. Id. at 110 (describing the totality of the circumstances approach employed by the court as
the “more lenient[] approach”).
45. See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 726 (2012) (“The due process check
for reliability, Brathwaite made plain, comes into play only after the defendant establishes
improper police conduct. The very purpose of the check, the Court noted, was to avoid depriving
the jury of identification evidence that is reliable, notwithstanding improper police conduct.”).
46. 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
47. Id. at 728.
48. Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 VAND. L. REV. 451, 460 (2012).
49. See Kevin Krug, The Relationship Between Confidence and Accuracy: Current Thoughts
of the Literature and a New Era of Research, 3 APPLIED PSYCHOL. CRIM. JUST. 7, 9 (2007)
(concluding that the bulk of social-science research suggests “that confidence is a poor indicator
of memory accuracy”); Gary L. Wells & R. C. L. Lindsay, Methodological Notes on the
Accuracy–Confidence Relation in Eyewitness Identifications, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 413, 418
(1985) (same). For a meta-analysis finding a limited but nonzero relationship between confidence
and accuracy at the time of selection, see Siegfried Ludwig Sporer et al., Choosing, Confidence,
and Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence–Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness Identification
Studies, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 315, 315–17 (1995). For an example of the particular issues
relating to retrospective certainty, see Amy L. Bradfield et al., The Damaging Effect of
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balancing test—especially one tilted so explicitly in favor of
admissibility—few facts on the ground will actually mandate exclusion of
an identification. How much delay between crime and identification is too
much? What would make a viewing opportunity so limited as to justify
exclusion? Given the vagueness of the factors, any court that cares to admit
a particular identification can likely tell an adequate story to justify its
decision, even for quite dubious identification evidence produced through
suggestive methods.50
This deferential approach to admitting eyewitness identifications,
coupled with substantial, emerging social-science research conducted by
psychologists, created a substantial opening (and need) for expert testimony
in this area. To put it differently, if nearly all identifications are admissible,
and if defects typically are understood to go to weight rather than
admissibility, then clearly the defendant should have the opportunity to
argue that a particular identification does not actually deserve much—or
any—weight. Simultaneously, social-science research began to provide
some powerful fodder for challenges to weight by identifying and studying
a range of “estimator factors” that appear to effect the accuracy of
identification—factors like whether a gun or other weapon was involved,
whether the identification was of someone of a different race from the
observer, or whether the observer was under substantial stress at the time of
making the observation.
B.

The Judicial Assessment of Confessions:
The Emphasis on Voluntariness, Not Reliability

With respect to confession evidence, substantive reliability is—if it is
possible—even less regulated by courts than it is with eyewitness
identification. Although reliability was deemed an important concern in
assessing confessions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
beginning in the middle of the twentieth century the courts took a
jurisprudential turn away from reliability and toward inquiries focused on
Confirming Feedback on the Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy,
87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 112, 112–14 (2002).
50. In fact, for example, in Garrett’s examination of DNA exonerations, none of the nearly
forty defendants who alleged some form of police impropriety in the identification procedure
which led to their (erroneous) identification were granted relief. GARRETT, supra note 5, at 187.
In addition, many courts will permit an in-court identification by the witness even if they have
excluded the earlier identification on the dubious theory that the witness’s in-court identification
has an “independent origin” of the events (and is therefore directly mentally matching the in-court
identification to the actual event, unmediated by the problematic intermediate identification
process). Garrett, supra note 48, at 465–66. For a description of the operation of this approach
and a strong critique of it, see generally id. However, some states have begun to take more
aggressive approaches than the federal courts to the judicial assessment of the reliability of
eyewitness identification. For a discussion of some recent state developments, see Jules Epstein,
Irreparable Misidentifications and Reliability: Reassessing the Threshold for Admissibility of
Eyewitness Identification, 58 VILL. L. REV. 69, 79–81 (2013).
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voluntariness and coercion.51 While initially the language of voluntariness
was deployed in the service of concerns about trustworthiness and
reliability, “voluntariness” gradually became instead a purely procedural
concern grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and focused not on accuracy per se but on the confessor’s selfdetermination and the freedom to speak or choose silence in the face of
police methods.52 Consider, for example, this language from the 1961
Supreme Court case Culombe v. Connecticut:53
The ultimate test remains that . . . of voluntariness. Is the confession
the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its
maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against
him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for
self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confessions
offends due process.54
The key question is not reliability, but whether the speaker’s will is
“overborne” or remains free. The real issue at the heart of the voluntariness
inquiry, as the Court made absolutely explicit in a later case, was not
accuracy as an independent value, but rather the presence of illegitimate
police coercion.55
But even if reliability is not central to admissibility, that obviously
does not make it irrelevant to the evaluation of an admissible confession’s
probative value. Though the area is not as substantially researched as
eyewitness identifications (and is also by its nature harder to study

51. For an account of this transition and an argument to revive a focus on reliability, see
Richard A. Leo et al., Promoting Accuracy in the Use of Confession Evidence: An Argument for
Pretrial Reliability Assessments to Prevent Wrongful Convictions, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 759, 779–80
(2013) (detailing the shift in the Court’s jurisprudence). See also Steven Penney, Theories of
Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 309, 310 (1998) (providing a
historical account of the shift in standard).
52. Leo et al., supra note 51, at 780–81. See also YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 10–11 (1980) (contending that the term
“voluntariness” was originally a “synonym for the ‘trustworthiness’ or ‘reliability’ test”).
53. 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
54. Id. at 602.
55. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (holding that “coercive police activity is
a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). To be sure, coercion and accuracy may well
be related—coercive processes may significantly increase the chance of inaccurate confessions.
But sometimes coercive methods may in fact produce accurate confessions—for reasons
independent of accuracy we may well deem their use unacceptable, but the reason for that is not
accuracy itself. Similarly, strong evidence exists to show that even when confessions are
voluntary and no illegal coercion has been applied, they are not therefore necessarily accurate.
Leo et al., supra note 51, at 765–67 (describing how even seemingly innocuous police activity,
like disclosure of nonpublic crime details, can lead to inaccurate confessions). See generally Saul
M. Kassin, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Reform, 17 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 249, 251 (2008) (describing various characteristics and interrogation
techniques that increase the likelihood of false confessions).
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effectively through experiments),56 a growing body of research contributes
to our understanding of the causes and circumstances that increase the risks
of false confessions, including both characteristics of the suspect (e.g.,
juveniles and those with mental disabilities may be at increased risk to
confess falsely), as well as characteristics of the interrogation process
(including the length of the interrogation or the police falsely claiming to
have strong evidence pointing to the suspect).57 This research also reveals
some of the characteristics often present within confessions subsequently
found to be false—like the police frequently “feeding” the correct
information to the suspect rather than eliciting through questioning
(accurate) information about the crime previously unknown to them or
“contaminating” the interrogation by providing information not publicly
known about the crime and then treating it as evidence of guilt when the
defendant repeats back this information.58
In some ways, to be sure, the lack of doctrinal focus on reliability is
conceptually separate from the question of the use of expert evidence in
these areas. Even if courts engaged in robust reliability assessments as a
prerequisite to admissibility of confessions and eyewitness identification
testimony, presumably the admissibility decision by a judge would not
remove from the fact finder the responsibility to assess the appropriate
probative value of the eyewitness identification or the confession—and
assessing reliability is (or at a minimum should be) a central part of
determining that probative value.59 Therefore, expert testimony could well
still be of assistance to the fact finder even if the court had a more robust
reliability requirement underlying admissibility. Alternatively, if socialscience research had few significant findings relating to these areas, expert

56. For both areas, archival or field studies raise complicated issues about knowing “ground
truth.” But eyewitness identification is much more easily studied in an experimental setting than
false confession—it is not difficult to design an experiment to test people’s ability to make a
correct identification (though, to be sure, it is difficult to create experimental conditions that are as
stressful and potentially traumatic as a real crime). It is more difficult to create experimental
conditions that could induce false confessions in circumstances with serious consequences akin to
a police interrogation.
57. Kassin, supra note 55, at 250–52.
58. Brandon Garrett, Contaminated Confessions Revisited, 101 VA. L. REV. 408–15 (2015);
Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications, 37 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L., 332, 337 (2009).
59. We see precisely this situation with Daubert—that is to say the judge’s gatekeeping
responsibility vis-à-vis expert evidence requires a direct focus on validity and reliability—but
clearly, parties ought nonetheless to be able to challenge the reliability of any given item of expert
evidence, notwithstanding that the judge has already made her own assessment of reliability prior
to permitting the evidence. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594–95
(1993) (holding that the inquiry into expert evidence is concentrated on scientific validity,
evidentiary relevance, and reliability).
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testimony might not be of assistance to a jury, regardless of whether or not
the court meaningfully evaluated reliability.60
C.

The (Limited) Rise of Expert Identification and False Confession
Evidence

It is speculative, to be sure, but there may well be some degree of
connection between the lack of any serious reliability inquiry by the court
and the rise of expert-witness evidence in these areas. This combination—a
well-developed social-science literature examining factors relating to
reliability and a lack of judicial assessment—creates a particularly ample
conceptual space for expert testimony at trial. An emerging body of
research bears directly on the validity of key forms of evidence, but courts
have decided, structurally, not to engage with this literature when assessing
admissibility.
This lack of consideration of reliability in admissibility decisions may,
therefore, over time have created hydraulic pressure to consider it elsewhere
in the trial process, and this may in part explain the increasing willingness
on the part of courts to admit expert testimony, particularly vis-à-vis the
limits of eyewitness identification. The rise of knowledge about wrongful
convictions and the important role that erroneous identifications (and false
confessions) have played in many of the known wrongful convictions no
doubt further contribute to the increased willingness, in recent years, to
admit these forms of testimony to assist the jury in its evaluation of the
evidence.61
Indeed, in its recent report on eyewitness identification, the National
Academy of Sciences urges courts to take very seriously the use of expert
evidence in this area to assist the fact finder.62 As the report states:
Contrary to the suggestion of some courts, the committee
recommends that judges have the discretion to allow expert
testimony on relevant precepts of eyewitness memory and
identifications. Expert witnesses can explain scientific research in
detail, capture the nuances of the research, and focus their testimony
60. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows expert evidence only when “the expert’s
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” FED. R. EVID. 702(a) (emphasis added). Therefore,
courts regularly exclude expert evidence if they do not believe it will assist the trier of fact. See,
e.g., Boyd v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 158 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 1998) (commenting on the trial
court’s “broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of the expert’s evidence”).
61. On wrongful convictions see, for example, GARRETT, supra note 5, at 251. In the 250
exonerees Garrett studied in his book, he found that misidentification by an eyewitness was
present in 76% of the cases. Id. at 8–9. He also found that 16% of the exonerees in his sample
confessed to crimes they did not commit. Id. at 18. For similar findings from a broader
examination of exonerations, see generally SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT’L
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012 (2012).
62. IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note at 2, at 111.
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on the most relevant research. Expert witnesses can convey current
information based on the state of the research at the time of a trial.
Expert witnesses can also be cross-examined, and limitations of the
research can be expressed to the jury.63
In urging greater use and acceptance of expert witnesses in this area, the
committee is both reflecting a sea change well underway and, likely,
encouraging its further development.
But that said, there is little doubt that expert testimony is still only
used in a small fraction of those cases in which it might be relevant.64 This
state of affairs results sometimes because it is still excluded—but far more
often there is simply no serious attempt to introduce it in the first place.65
In many cases, defense attorneys may not be able to get funding for an
expert or—and in practice it leads to the same result—may not believe they
can get funding and hence may not even try.66 Though numbers are scarce,
a set of authors, including leading eyewitness-identification experts,
estimated (albeit, back in 1998) that the total number of American cases in
which experts provided testimony in the area could not possibly much
exceed five hundred.67 By contrast, an equally dated figure based on a
survey of practices suggests that eyewitness identification is the most
critical evidence in just under 80,000 criminal arrests a year.68 Even if,
given the prevalence of plea bargaining,69 we assume that only 5% of those
arrests actually go to trial, this would suggest that experts are testifying in
only roughly 8% of those cases involving eyewitness identification as a
crucial form of evidence. To be sure, both of these numbers should be
taken with a large grain of salt, and they are also dated by more than fifteen
years. But the fundamental reality is, without a doubt, that expert
63. Id.
64. See George Vallas, A Survey of Federal and State Standards for the Admission of Expert
Testimony on the Reliability of Eyewitnesses, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 97, 114–16 (2011) (noting that
while there has been a recent trend in both federal and state courts toward the acceptance of expert
eyewitness testimony, judicial approaches still vary across jurisdictions); infra notes 67–70 and
accompanying text.
65. See IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 2, at 40 (explaining that the expense of
eyewitness-identification experts can be a deterrent to their use).
66. As Identifying the Culprit recognizes, this problem is likely more acute in state courts than
in federal courts. Id.
67. Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups
and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 609 (1998).
68. Alvin G. Goldstein et al., Frequency of Eyewitness Identification in Criminal Cases: A
Survey of Prosecutors, 27 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y 71, 73 (1989). Specifically, they
estimated about 77,313 people were arrested in cases in which the eyewitness identification was
“crucial,” extrapolating this figure from a survey of district attorneys. Id.
69. Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-judges-after-rulings-onplea-deals.html, archived at http://perma.cc/BH3U-8KJ6 (stating that plea bargains end 97% of
federal cases and 94% of state cases); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Uncertain Bargains: The Rise of Plea
Bargaining in America, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (2005).
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eyewitness (and false confession) testimony is only used in a small
percentage of the cases in which it might be both appropriate and helpful.70
This means, in essence, that some defendants win the expert-access
lottery and others—not a few, but most—don’t even get a lottery ticket,
much less any winnings. Some get to sport couture attire, while others are
(metaphorically) naked.
III. Alternatives to Expert Witnesses
Live testimony by expert witnesses is used in only a small fraction of
cases in which their testimony might assist the jury. There is absolutely no
reason to believe that this situation can or will change dramatically. The
costs of experts, their scarcity, and the number of cases in which they might
be advisable make it impossible to imagine that we could use expert
psychological witnesses in all the cases in which they might have relevant,
helpful information.71
That reality invites a search for alternative methods for either
preventing unreliable testimony from reaching the jury in the first place or
for educating it about its possible limitations. In what follows, I will
explore two possible alternatives, showing in each case why they are
ultimately quite unsatisfactory even though they are superficially appealing.
Furthermore, the inadequacy of these alternatives strengthens the case for
taking more radical steps toward new methods of jury education, such as
modular testimony.
A.

Judicial Gatekeeping

I turn first to the possibility of judicial gatekeeping for reliability. As I
suggested earlier, it is plausible to think that the lack of a direct judicial
focus on reliability contributed, over time, to a greater openness to (and
need for) psychological experts in these areas.72 But perhaps a more
intensive judicial inquiry into reliability could itself serve as an alternative
to the use of expert psychological evidence. As I stated above, the two are
not direct substitutes for each other—even if judges were stronger
gatekeepers with regard to the reliability of confession and eyewitness
testimony, defendants might well wish to use expert social scientists to
inform the jury about what is known about circumstances and factors that

70. See, e.g., CRIM. JUSTICE SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO HOUSE OF DELEGATES
104D, at 2–3 (2008) (finding the problem of “mistaken eyewitness identification . . . a serious
problem in the United States” and recommending increased use of expert testimony on “crossracial identification” to combat the issue).
71. The American Bar Association recognizes this and explicitly “opposes exclusive reliance
on expert witnesses” due to their cost and the fact that only a “small number of persons [are]
qualified to testify as expert witnesses on cross-racial identification”). Id. at 3–4.
72. See supra subpart II(C).
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increase the risk of inaccuracy.73 A stricter admissibility standard would
not obviate the need for experts to help the jury assess the appropriate
weight of the admitted testimony. But the question is how we might
decrease the chances that mistaken eyewitness evidence or false confessions
lead fact finders to the use of expert evidence from psychologists. Put
bluntly, if fewer false confessions or mistaken eyewitness identifications
were admitted in the first place, there would be less need of expert
testimony designed to educate juries about the limits to these forms of
evidence and the possibilities for error.
Indeed, the recent National Academy of Science report on eyewitness
identification makes an important recommendation connected directly to
these issues of judicial assessment of reliability and the use of experts.
First, the committee recommends that judges engage in more robust pretrial
inquiry into reliability and that they should even do so independent of a
party’s request or objection to the evidence.74 The committee suggested
that judges should routinely examine key aspects of lineup design when
assessing an eyewitness identification and also look at whether lineup
procedures existed in documented form and, if so, whether they were in fact
followed.75 The committee recommendation continues: “If these initial
inquiries raise issues with the identification process, a judge could conduct
a pretrial hearing to review the reliability and admissibility of eyewitness
identification evidence.”76 At this point, the committee report backs off
slightly, suggesting that if indicia of unreliability are found, the judge
“should apply applicable law”77 in deciding whether to exclude or take any
other action—but given the flaccid state of the applicable law on this score,
this entreaty to apply it may, practically speaking, be asking for rather little.
Nonetheless, the committee’s recommendation certainly provides a
meaningful nudge toward more substantial evaluations of reliability by
judges.
A more robust assessment by judges of the reliability of eyewitness
identifications and confessions as a precondition for admissibility would
certainly be one possible method by which to reduce the number of false
confessions and faulty or mistaken identifications used in court. Indeed, in
addition to the gestures in that direction by the recent National Academy of
Science report on eyewitness identification, several scholars have recently
argued in favor of meaningful assessment of the reliability of any given

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 2, at 109–10.
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id.
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eyewitness identification or confession as a prerequisite to its
admissibility.78
On the face of it, direct judicial assessment of the reliability of these
powerful yet problematic forms of evidence is indeed appealing. In the
context of expert evidence, judges regularly assess reliability as a
precondition for determining admissibility—why not apply a similar
approach to these powerful forms of evidence as well? Presumably if
judges managed to exclude confessions or eyewitness evidence likely to be
unreliable, that would indeed be a valuable safeguard against the danger of
erroneous convictions.
However nice such an approach sounds in theory, there is a significant
problem in practice: we do not actually have validated methods by which to
distinguish precisely, in a specific case, an accurate eyewitness identification from an inaccurate one or a true confession from a false one.
Psychological research has shown us a good deal about tendencies in the
aggregate and about, for example, estimator factors that appear to increase
the risk of making an inaccurate identification.79 But these are aggregate
tendencies with varying (and sometimes quite limited) effect sizes. Going
from knowledge about these aggregate tendencies to a diagnostic
conclusion about reliability in a specific case usually goes well beyond our
current state of scientific and psychological knowledge.
Let us briefly consider one example. The presence of a weapon during
the event appears to decrease the accuracy of identifications made
afterwards—but obviously, this does not mean that all, or even most,
identifications made in relation to crimes involving weapons are therefore
inaccurate. This “weapons focus” phenomenon has been found in most
(though not all) laboratory studies that have examined it, but the effect sizes
are often moderate and sometimes the presence of the weapon in an
experiment seems to hurt the accuracy of feature recall but not necessarily

78. For arguments in favor of a reliability-based approach to the judicial assessment of
eyewitness identification, see, for example, Epstein, supra note 50, at 96–100, arguing for an
acknowledgedly amorphous sliding-scale approach to admissibility of eyewitness identification
focused on reliability; Sandra Guerra Thompson, Daubert Gatekeeping for Eyewitness
Identifications, 65 SMU L. REV. 593, 596 (2012), arguing that Daubert’s reliability focus should
apply more stringently to eyewitness identifications; and Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1495 (2008), advocating for a corroboration requirement when the state
presents eye witness testimony. For arguments in favor of reliability-focused reforms for
confession evidence, see, for example, Richard A. Leo et al., supra note 51, at 764, proposing a
framework for analyzing reliability of confession evidence, and Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing
Reliability Back in: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006
WIS. L. REV. 479, 486–87, arguing that recording custodial interrogations should be a prerequisite
of reliability.
79. See, e.g., Wells et al., supra note 67, at 603, 613–17 (describing factors that contribute to a
false eyewitness identification). See generally sources cited supra note 2.
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the ability to identify someone accurately.80 Furthermore, how do these
experimental findings translate into the real world? This is not altogether
clear—indeed, some of the few studies focusing on real-world situations
have not found a clear weapons focus effect at all, though there are also
plausible reasons to discount these findings (both because of difficulties in
making reliable inferences when we don’t actually know ground truth and
also because in field studies, as opposed to experiments, the underlying
scenarios, because they are real, are inevitably so much more complex that
any specific issue, like weapons focus, may be swamped by other
characteristics of the identification circumstances).81
My point is not the details of the weapons focus effect—a topic on
which many dozens of papers have been written. The point is more general.
There are numerous estimator variables that have been shown across a
number of studies to have some statistically significant effect on memory,
recall, and identification. But this effect does not necessarily mean that the
presence of a given variable—or even several—signals an inaccurate
identification. It means, at most, that if all other aspects are equal, an
identification with this concerning estimator variable may be more likely to
be erroneous than an identification without it. But the effect size of any
given variable may be quite modest. Moreover, in the real world, to say
that “all other aspects are equal” is more or less meaningless. Individuals
vary in their attention to detail or their general observational accuracy.
Moreover, any given estimator variable needs to be understood alongside
the other dimensions of the particular identification circumstances. A
witness who has a longer time to observe the perpetrator may be more
accurate, even when a weapon is involved, than one who has only a short
opportunity for observation. But how the different aspects of an
identification interrelate has received far less careful experimental study to
date than individual estimator (or system) variables.82
Given this state of affairs, ought we to really wish for judges to make
reliability determinations about an identification based on their evaluations
of the estimator variables? These variables can, to be sure, legitimately

80. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Fawcett et al., Of Guns and Geese: A Meta-Analytic Review of the
‘Weapon Focus’ Literature, 19 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 35, 44 (2013) (“[W]eapon presence appears
to be clearly detrimental to feature accuracy (e.g., recall), but only sporadically affects
identification accuracy.”); Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon
Focus Effect, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 413, 420–21 (1992) (concluding as a result of metaanalysis of several previous experiments that the weapon-focus effect is statistically significant,
but the magnitude of the effect is not great).
81. Steblay, supra note 80, at 422.
82. See IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 2, at xiii–xiv (noting the lack of certainty
surrounding the interplay of reliability factors in eyewitness identifications).
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raise red flags—but if they cannot be truly diagnostic, is it appropriate for
the judge to determine reliability, and in turn admissibility, on their basis?83
To make the point in a slightly different fashion, consider that we do
not let experts opine in court on whether a specific eyewitness identification
is or is not reliable. When experts testify, they are generally permitted to
describe the factors relevant to the specific case that have been studied and
what research has shown about them, but they are not permitted to tell the
jury that it therefore should or should not believe any given witness. As
one psychological expert put it on direct examination vis-à-vis his role in
the case:
Q ARE YOU HERE TO GIVE AN OPINION AS TO THE
ACCURACY OF THE WITNESSES IN THIS CASE IN THEIR
IDENTIFICATIONS?
A OH, NO, NO. AS I UNDERSTAND IT, AGAIN, MY ROLE IS
QUITE NARROW. IT’S TO AVOID GIVING ANY OPINIONS
THAT MIGHT EXPRESS TO YOU ALL, THE TRIERS OF FACT,
THAT I HAVE SOME SORT OF TAKE ON WHETHER THE
WITNESSES ARE RIGHT OR WRONG OR CORRECT OR
INCORRECT, AND TO JUST EXPLAIN THE CURRENT STATE
OF THE SCIENCE. IN MY VERY NARROW AREA OF EXPERTISE OF MEMORY AND SUGGESTIBILITY TO THE TRIERS
OF FACT.84
Later in the direct examination, the expert reiterated the point:
THERE’S CERTAINLY NOTHING I COULD GIVE YOU ALL
THAT CAN BE QUANTIFIED AS, “THIS IS IT.” THESE ARE
JUST FACTORS THAT HAVE BEEN FOUND TO AFFECT
WITNESSES BOTH IN THE FIELD AND THEN AS DEMONSTRATED IN THE LABORATORY.85
On cross, the point was made even more strongly that the expert could
testify to the relevant phenomenon, but not apply it to the specific case:

83. The same difficulty applies to false-confession evidence. Consider contamination. There
is substantial evidence that many false confessions contain examples of interrogators providing
information about the crime during the course of the interrogation. When that information appears
in the confession, it enhances the apparent validity. Leo et al., supra note 51, at 765–66. But it
may also be that true confessions frequently reveal examples of contamination by interrogators as
well. Until we know substantially more about the base-rate frequency of contamination in true
and false confessions—along with the base rates for true and false confessions themselves—we
cannot possibly know that a confession is unreliable simply because some degree of
contamination can be pointed to. This inability to diagnose falseness from characteristics like
contamination means that reliability hearings for false-confession evidence, while superficially
appealing, are in fact unlikely to be effective. See id. at 779.
84. Transcript of Record at 2434, State v. White, 2007 WL 5248507 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A.
Cnty. Sept. 20, 2007) (No. B204494).
85. Id. at 2454.
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Q NONE OF THE STUDIES THAT YOU’VE SHARED WITH US
TALK ABOUT UNIVERSAL TRUTHS, CORRECT?
A NO, I WOULDN’T TAKE IT TO THAT LEVEL.
Q YOU BASICALLY SHARE WITH US SOME STUDIES
WHICH FOUND CERTAIN THINGS? . . .
....
Q YOU’RE ESSENTIALLY SAYING, DOCTOR, ISN’T IT, THAT
YOU CANNOT PREDICT WHETHER OR NOT STRESS AFFECTED AN EYEWITNESS, AN EYEWITNESS’S MEMORY?
A IN ANY GIVEN CASE?
Q YES.
A NO. THAT IS CLEARLY UP TO THE TRIERS OF FACT AND
ALL MY JOB IS, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, IS TO EXPLAIN
GENERALLY-ACCEPTED FINDINGS IN THE RESEARCH
THAT MIGHT BE BEYOND THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE OF
FOLKS WHO DON’T DO RESEARCH IN THIS AREA AS THEY
EVALUATE AND WEIGH THE EVIDENCE ON THEIR OWN.86
And with respect to the weapons focus issue in particular:
Q WEAPON FOCUS.
THE STUDIES THAT YOU’VE
DESCRIBED FOR US BASICALLY INDICATE THAT IN SOME
SITUATIONS SOME WITNESSES FOCUS ON WEAPONS, ON
THE WEAPON INVOLVED?
A YES.
Q IT DOESN’T MEAN THAT IT HAPPENS ALL THE TIME,
CORRECT?
A OH, NO. EVERYONE RESPONDS DIFFERENTLY TO A
WEAPON BEING PRESENT, I WOULD SAY.87
I have used excerpts from this transcript as an example, but the
expert’s testimony is quite typical in this respect. Psychological experts in
these areas do not tell the jury directly whether or not to believe the
eyewitness identification.88 The reasons for this limitation are twofold:
first, and most important, that the science simply does not presently support
this degree of specific, diagnostic conclusion about a particular witness;89
and second, that especially given the lack of scientific basis for reaching a

86. Id. at 2459, 2472.
87. Id. at 2479.
88. Chelsea Moore, Is Perception Reality?: An Argument Against the Use of Rule 403 for the
Exclusion of Eyewitness Identification Expert Testimony, 6 FIU L. REV. 163, 177 (2010).
89. See IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 2, at 112 (noting that “the committee has seen
no evidence that the scientific research has reached the point that would properly permit an expert
to opine . . . on the accuracy of an identification by an eyewitness in a specific case”).
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conclusion about a given witness, for the expert to opine in this way to the
fact finder would invade the province of the jury, impermissibly entering
into their legitimate sphere of judgment about credibility.90
But if we do not permit the experts to opine about reliability, why
should we allow judges to do so? If the experts themselves lack a
legitimate scientific basis for reaching a conclusion about reliability in a
given case, surely the (less expert) judges will also lack a legitimate
scientific basis for theirs as well. Nor is it at all obvious that a judge’s
evaluation of the reliability of any given eyewitness identification would be
more accurate than that of a jury, especially a jury who has had the
opportunity to be educated about what the social-science evidence does and
does not show about relevant factors in the case. If judges could in fact
distinguish accurate from inaccurate identifications with a high degree of
accuracy, or in any event a significantly higher degree of accuracy than a
jury, having them evaluate reliability as a prerequisite for admissibility
would be an attractive and perhaps justifiable policy. But if their error rate
would be substantial or similar to that of the jury, this suggests we should
avoid the policy and leave the assessment to the fact finder.
It is fair to ask the following question: if judges cannot assess accuracy
reliably, why ought we believe that juries can plausibly handle the task?
The honest answer is that juries will—and do, as we know from the many
wrongful conviction cases that have come to light91—make errors as well.
But there are nonetheless two reasons to prefer having juries—preferably
educated in some way by experts—reach these judgments about reliability
rather than judges doing it themselves.
First, as a matter of system design, credibility judgments under
conditions of uncertainty are typically something we leave to the jury. The
issue at stake is going from a set of general inferences—about factors
influencing the accuracy of eyewitnesses or the validity of a confession—to
a specific determination about the case at issue and the credibility of and
weight to be given to a particular witness. Judging matters like credibility
and the weight of a specific item of evidence are, within our system, core
jury functions.92 So unless we have good grounds for believing that the
judge will achieve a significantly higher degree of accuracy, from an
institutional design perspective this task is better left with the jury.

90. Scott Woller, Rethinking the Role of Expert Testimony Regarding the Reliability of
Eyewitness Identifications in New York, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 323, 325 n.15 (2003).
91. See GARRETT, supra note 5, at 213–22 (documenting various cases of wrongful
convictions); GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 61, at 43–50 (documenting exonerations following
erroneous convictions and surveying contributing causes).
92. See Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474, 477 (1918) (holding that the appellate court
cannot invade “the province of the jury by determining questions of credibility and weight of
evidence”). On the jury’s role as “lie detector” and credibility assessor, see generally George
Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575 (1997).

MNOOKIN.TOPRINTER.RESUBMIT2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

Modular Expert Evidence

6/8/2015 11:38 AM

1835

Moreover, part of what the jury may be better situated to do is to evaluate
this evidence holistically in relation to the other evidence in the case. If the
identification is corroborated by substantial other evidence, the jury can
(and indeed should) consider this other evidence in assessing the
identification. Conversely, if the experts teach the jury about how the
characteristics of this identification reveal reasons for possible concern
about accuracy, and the identification is in fact the only evidence in the
case, the lack of other evidence coupled with the concerns about the
eyewitness identification or confession could legitimately give the jury
pause.
By contrast, typically admissibility decisions about a given item of
evidence are made in a fairly atomistic manner;93 it would be somewhat odd
if a judge admitted an identification in a given circumstance because other
nonidentification evidence also pointed toward the guilt of the perpetrator
but would have excluded the same item of evidence without the
corroboration.94 To be sure, we do sometimes have corroboration
requirements as a precondition for admissibility. But to assess reliability
based partly on the strength of other evidence in the case goes against the
typical grain of how judges make such decisions—and potentially creates
significant dangers of cognitive bias as well.
The reality, then, is that judges simply do not have a legitimate basis
for reaching reliability determinations about eyewitness identification or
confessions in most circumstances—unless their concerns about reliability
derive from concerns about the illegitimacy of the procedures by which the
information was extracted. In some circumstances, judges could indeed
endeavor to regulate these kinds of evidence by giving their procedural
analyses more teeth. For example, suggestive behaviors by the police
during interrogation or lineup could be grounds for exclusion—even
without a “very substantial likelihood”95 of error. Failure to adhere to
social-science-based best practices for lineup design could also be grounds
for exclusion. Similarly, failure to videotape the entirety of an interrogation
93. See Mirjan Damaška, Atomistic and Holistic Evaluation of Evidence: A Comparative
View, in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN ON HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY 91, 91–98 (David S. Clark ed., 1990) (suggesting the
Anglo-American adversarial system has strongly atomistic tendencies, especially as compared to
the Continental civil law systems); John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 1209, 1213 (2006) (noting an “atomic” tendency as a characteristic of evidence law);
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Atomism, Holism, and the Judicial Assessment of Evidence, 60 UCLA L.
REV. 1524, 1531 (2013) (describing holism as the counterpoint to the default approach to
admissibility).
94. There are some limited circumstances where judges do consider corroboration in
assessing admissibility—for example, in the hearsay exception for statements against interest.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(B). For a discussion of corroboration in relation to the atomism and
holism of judicial decision making in evidence, see Mnookin, supra note 93, at 1551.
95. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1976) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377, 384 (1968)).
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process could, unless exigent circumstances excuse the lapse, mean
exclusion. As a matter of public policy, holding police accountable for
their compliance with best practices is probably a sound idea. Moreover, in
the aggregate this would presumably enhance reliability—the best practices
are (or at least ought to be) designed precisely to maximize accuracy.96
Rejecting evidence when these practices are not followed would strongly
incentivize compliance by police and investigators—and presumably, this
would also enhance the accuracy of the evidence permitted in court.
However, much of the research on eyewitness identification does not
relate to police behavior. Estimator variables simply do not have anything
to do with how the police behave in a lineup procedure. Regulating lineup
design just does not speak to this dimension of the problem. In other areas,
we may not know enough yet to insist upon best practices with confidence.
There are, to be sure, some areas where we probably do have an adequate
knowledge base to drive policy: for example, the benefits of blinding
procedures during lineups, making certain that the officer interacting with a
witness during a lineup does not herself know which individual is the
suspect, in order to avoid purposely or inadvertently signaling that
information to the witness and thereby biasing the response.97 But for other
aspects of lineup design we may not know enough to insist on specific
process design as a sine qua non of admissibility. Even sequential lineups
versus simultaneous lineups, a topic that has received much attention and
study in recent years, remains sufficiently controversial that it would be
hard to justify making a given design a requirement for admissibility.98
Thus, while enhanced procedural scrutiny may be valuable, it will
certainly not obviate the need for expert testimony on system variables, as
well as the pros and cons of any given lineup design. Similar arguments
hold sway for confession evidence as well—enhanced procedural
requirements and enforcement via judicial exclusion if they are not
followed may well be worthwhile and accuracy enhancing. But it is far
from clear that the reliability of a given confession can be consistently
assessed accurately by judges (or by experts themselves).

96. I am oversimplifying, here, in that accuracy is not simply one thing. Some methods might
decrease false positives but also decrease true positives. Whether and to what degree we have a
preference between type I and type II errors might affect how we evaluate best practices in the
area. IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 2, at 86 n.43.
97. Wells et al., supra note 67, at 627.
98. See, e.g., Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Sequential and Simultaneous
Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 459, 468–71
(2001) (concluding that sequential lineup procedure is generally superior to simultaneous but
expressing reluctance to recommend its categorical adoption due to uncertainty in the practical
application of the sequential procedure).
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Jury Instructions

So far, we have seen that routinizing the use of psychological experts
is simply not feasible given their cost and scarcity. Furthermore, I have
suggested that attempting to regulate at the front end by implementing a
robust reliability screen by judges has its own difficulties. What else then
might we do? In the face of this dilemma, many courts, commentators, and
scholars have argued that jury instructions could be a valuable substitute for
expert testimony. If the key, central social findings could be presented
succinctly to the jury through instructions, then access to this information
could become far more widespread and fairly distributed among defendants.
For example, in a concurring opinion Seventh Circuit Judge Frank
Easterbrook ruminated as follows about the powers of judges to incorporate
science into how they operate their courts:
Similarly a judge, recognizing the main conclusions of the scholarly
study of memory—that “accuracy of recollection decreases at a
geometric rather than arithmetic rate (so passage of time has a highly
distorting effect on recollection); accuracy of recollection is not
highly correlated with the recollector’s confidence; and memory is
highly suggestible—people are easily ‘reminded’ of events that
never happened, and having been ‘reminded’ may thereafter hold the
false recollection as tenaciously as they would a true one,” could
block a lawyer from arguing that a given witness is sure of his
recollection, and therefore is more likely to be right. The judge
could inform jurors of the rapid decrease of accurate recollection,
and the problem of suggestibility, without encountering the delay
and pitfalls of expert testimony. Jurors are more likely to accept that
information coming from a judge than from a scholar, whose skills
do not lie in the ability to persuade lay jurors (and whose fidgeting
on the stand, an unusual place for a genuine scholar, is apt to be
misunderstood).
Altogether it is much better for judges to
incorporate scientific knowledge about the trial process into that
process, rather than to make the subject a debatable issue in every
case. There remains a question about where judges acquire scientific
knowledge, for they too may be mistaken in what they think they
know. Still, professional adjudicators who attend continuing judicial
education programs and read the scholarly literature are more likely
to absorb the lessons of science than are jurors force fed a little
information during a trial.99
For Easterbrook, instructions trump actual experts as a method of
providing meta-information, or educational materials.100 Instructions are

99. United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1120 (7th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
100. Id.
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more authoritative.101 They are more efficient.102 They provide information
in an across-the-board manner applicable to many cases, rather than treating
it as a “debatable issue” over and over again.103
This instruction-focused approach to some of the insights from the
psychology of memory and perception is beginning to take hold in a few
jurisdictions. Massachusetts,104 Oregon,105 and New Jersey106 have all
engaged in serious efforts to develop jury instructions that thoughtfully
incorporate the scientific findings into digestible descriptions.
At first blush, this approach indeed seems promising. As Judge
Easterbrook recognized, it is efficient and may well be seen by the fact
finder as more neutral than had similar information been presented by a
party via expert evidence. It is also inexpensive—it can be used at any trial
at which it is relevant; unlike traditional expert testimony, it can easily be
scaled up to meet demand. Indeed, some of those who have tepidly
supported jury instructions have done so primarily because of the stark
reality of the cost issues relating to experts that make it simply impossible
to use them in their traditional form in all the cases in which they would
legitimately be called for.107
However, I would suggest that jury instructions are akin to using a
Band-Aid on a head wound: perhaps better than nothing, but not the right
solution to a serious problem. In practice, some jury instructions are
disingenuous and misleading about the source of their authority. Others are
more candid, but thereby reflect a kind of mistake in which that which is
actually evidence is presented as instruction.
Some jury instructions—those I consider disingenuous—implicitly
reference social-science findings but don’t recognize them as such.
Consider the following suggested instruction on cross-racial identification:
In this case, the identifying witness is of a different race than the
defendant. You may consider, if you think it is appropriate to do so,
whether the fact that the defendant is of a different race . . . has
affected the accuracy of . . . [an] identification. You should consider
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT STUDY GRP. ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE JUSTICES 3–4 (2013).
105. State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 685–88 (Or. 2012). See also Rebecca Brown & Stephen
Saloom, The Imperative of Eyewitness Identification Reform and the Role of Police Leadership,
42 U. BALT. L. REV. 535, 546–47, 551–52 (2013) (explaining the Oregon and New Jersey
Supreme Courts’ approaches to incorporating scientific findings into eyewitness identifications).
106. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 924–25 (N.J. 2011).
107. IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 2, at 40–41. See also CRIM. JUSTICE SECTION,
AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 70, at 3–4 (noting the existence of just a “handful” of experts in Los
Angeles and none in many rural areas and considering that in many areas it is a struggle to pay for
attorneys, and it is simply inconceivable that judges will fund experts in the bulk of the cases).
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that in ordinary human experience, some people may have greater
difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race than
they do in identifying members of their own race.108
The serious problem with this instruction is that it locates the relevant
source of knowledge undergirding its point in “ordinary human experience”
rather than psychology or social-science research. It basically tells the jury
members that if they have found in their ordinary experience that
identifying people of other races can be harder, then they may consider that
experience in their evaluation of the evidence in the case. But what if this is
not the perceived experience of the jurors? What if they do not believe that
they have found in their experience any difference in making identifications
across race? In that circumstance, this instruction gives them absolutely
nothing useful to work with. To whatever extent the point is actually
counterintuitive, rather than consistent, with their lived experience the jury
instruction becomes utterly irrelevant. This jury instruction recasts what are
actually research findings109 as common-sense intuitions—when they may
not be common sense at all, but rather potentially discordant with the jury’s
perceptions and intuition of the world.
The reason why some courts and commentators elect to use
disingenuous instructions like this is because it makes them, in form,
ordinary instructions. There is nothing wrong with alerting jurors to the
possible need to consider matters that they have found based on their
common sense and experience. So if their experiences formed the source of
knowledge and belief for many jurors in assessing these questions—if it
really were common sense—then this instruction would not be problematic.
We might still wonder how much effect such an instruction would have—
perhaps it would serve just as a reminder nudge of sorts to the jury to
consider something that many of them already knew—but it would, at least
as a formalistic matter, be quite legitimate.110 But if this information is not
common sense—but rather the not-altogether-intuitive findings of social
science—then to cast it as if it were common sense is misleading,
indubitably a legal fiction, designed to get this information about crossracial identifications in front of the jurors even if oddly cast.

108. CRIM. JUSTICE SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 70, at 4.
109. See IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 2, at 96–97 (describing the own-race bias).
110. There is a substantial literature on the effectiveness of jury instructions; overall, it
suggests some skepticism about their effectiveness. In the eyewitness context in particular, there
have been a handful of studies looking at the effectiveness of instructions on modifying juries’
attitudes and beliefs. For a review of these studies, see Richard A. Wise et al., An Examination of
the Causes and Solutions to Eyewitness Error, 5 FRONTIERS PSYCHIATRY, art. no. 102, at 3–5
(2014), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4131297/pdf/fpsyt-05-00102.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/L3S4-KUBR.
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Recently, the state of New Jersey, which used to have an instruction
similar to the one quoted above,111 decided to take more radical steps. State
v. Henderson,112 after canvassing the scientific literature in substantial
length, ended up deciding to require detailed jury instructions that reference
scientific findings as their source.113 In 2012, New Jersey indeed promulgated new jury instructions, and these, unlike most of the predecessor
instructions in New Jersey and elsewhere, explicitly located their authority
in scientific research. Given the novelty of this approach, I will quote the
instructions at some length:
Eyewitness identification evidence must be scrutinized carefully.
Human beings have the ability to recognize other people from past
experiences and to identify them at a later time, but research has
shown that there are risks of making mistaken identifications. That
research has focused on the nature of memory and the factors that
affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications.
....
Relying on some of the research that has been done, I will instruct
you on specific factors you should consider in this case in
determining whether the eyewitness identification evidence is
reliable. . . . Although nothing may appear more convincing than a
witness’s categorical identification of a perpetrator, you must
critically analyze such testimony. Such identifications, even if made
in good faith, may be mistaken. Therefore, when analyzing such
testimony, be advised that a witness’s level of confidence, standing
alone, may not be an indication of the reliability of the identification.
In deciding what weight, if any, to give to the identification
testimony, you should consider the following factors that are related
to the witness, the alleged perpetrator, and the criminal incident
itself.
....
Weapon Focus: You should consider whether the witness saw
a weapon during the incident and the duration of the crime. The
presence of a weapon can distract the witness and take the
witness’s attention away from the perpetrator’s face. As a result,
the presence of a visible weapon may reduce the reliability of a
subsequent identification if the crime is of short duration. In
considering this factor, you should take into account the duration
of the crime because the longer the event, the more time the

111. See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 882–83.
112. 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
113. Id. at 925–26, 928.
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witness may have to adapt to the presence of the weapon and focus
on other details.
....
Confidence and Accuracy: You heard testimony that (insert
name of witness) expressed his/her level of certainty that the
person he/she selected is in fact the person who committed the
crime. As I explained earlier, a witness’s level of confidence,
standing alone, may not be an indication of the reliability of
the identification. Although some research has found that highly
confident witnesses are more likely to make accurate identifications,
eyewitness confidence is generally an unreliable indicator of
accuracy.
....
Cross-Racial Effects: Research has shown that people may
have greater difficulty in accurately identifying members of a
different race. You should consider whether the fact that the
witness and the defendant are not of the same race may have
influenced the accuracy of the witness’s identification.114
Notice the frequent and explicit references to research. On the one
hand, this is a definite improvement compared to the numerous states that
pretend that the appropriate epistemic authority for these inquiries is the
jury’s common sense and experience, when it is in fact nothing of the sort.
These findings come from psychological research, and many of them are
certainly not common sense (at least not yet). The New Jersey instructions
do not disingenuously suggest otherwise and instead locate these concerns
quite explicitly in the register of research and as findings of scientific
inquiry.
While as a matter of epistemic legitimacy that approach is quite right,
the problem is that it is both strange and inappropriate to instruct the jury
about scientific findings in this manner in a criminal case. These research
findings are not matters about which the court can legitimately take judicial
notice—they are not actually adjudicative facts (the only sort which the
relevant federal rule applies to)—and besides, in criminal cases, judicial
notice is not binding upon the fact finder.115
The fundamental problem is that these matters are, in fact, evidence.
They are not incontestable. They are not certain. They are also not findings
114. New Jersey Criminal Model Jury Instructions, Identification: In-Court Identification
Only (July 19, 2012), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2012/jury_instruc
tion.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/22Y2-SMV7 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). The
new jury instructions were made available through a link from a press release. See Press Release,
N.J. Courts, Supreme Court Releases Eyewitness Identification Criteria for Criminal Cases (July
19, 2012), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2012/pr120719a.htm, archived at
http://perma.cc/SJJ5-C3MX.
115. FED. R. EVID. 201(f).
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that are ideally reduced to a single sentence or two. Consider the
instruction about confidence and accuracy. Essentially, the fact finder is
told that science shows that confidence is not a reliable indicator of
accuracy—except sometimes, when it is. This instruction invites any
thinking person to ask further questions: Do we know when high
confidence does in fact correlate with accuracy? In what circumstances?
How often? And does lack of confidence correlate with lower-than-typical
accuracy? The jury instruction, as a form for providing information, does
not permit any genuine degree of exploration of these issues—they operate
as gestures about some knowledge about some categories and nothing more.
By contrast, with an expert witness there is the chance to explore the
research findings, their robustness, their blind spots, their degree of
consistency or controversy, and so on. With an expert, the proffering party
can offer significantly greater detail about the research findings and how
strong they are. Similarly, the opposing party has a real opportunity to
cross-examine the expert and to explore the limits of our scientific
knowledge or its inapplicability to this case—and, if the party wishes, to
call an expert of its own.
Out of a noble goal to reduce juries’ reliance on erroneous eyewitness
evidence, then, the state of New Jersey has made a category error: taking a
set of issues that are properly understood as evidence and attempting to turn
them into instructions instead. Although the instructions are reasonably
detailed, considering that they are instructions rather than evidence, they
nonetheless are unlikely to provide a jury with enough information to make
an intelligent decision about the applicability of the research findings to a
given case. The instructions say nothing about the strength or consistency
of the research findings. They say nothing about the effect sizes of the
various issues mentioned. To be sure, experts testifying do not always go
into that degree of detail either—but expert testimony offers far more
potential for educating the jury in a more thoughtful and nuanced way than
a sentence or two on some of the hot-button items can.116

116. For a tepid endorsement of instructions as a second-best solution compared to experts,
see IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 2, at 40–43. To be fair, with expert testimony as well
there are questions of effectiveness and whether expert testimony actually modifies juries’
behavior or understanding. Some studies do find that expert testimony produces greater
skepticism about eyewitness identification, but whether it produces greater sensitivity to the
differences in strength depending on particular qualities of the specific identification is far less
clear. See, e.g., Michael R. Leippe & Donna Eisenstadt, The Influence of Eyewitness Expert
Testimony on Jurors’ Beliefs and Judgments, in EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 169, 184–86 (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2009) (discussing various studies
conducted on whether expert testimony impacts jurors’ willingness to believe eyewitnesses and
determining that while expert testimony increases skepticism, such testimony may be discarded in
favor of believing the eyewitness).
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IV. In Defense of Modular, Repeat-Play Expert Testimony
Against this backdrop of plausible but problematic alternatives, I
return now in my final Part to the possibility of modular testimony. This
recent turn to jury instructions based explicitly on science should
conceptually open the door to modular testimony as well. As I said at the
outset, this category mistake reflects something important and relatively
unusual about these kinds of evidence. They are in great part simply not
case specific. The key social-science findings repeat in case after case.117
The framework, the science, the key research papers, the methodological
strengths and weaknesses—these do not change from case to case. The
specific variables at play in any given case can, of course, be different, but
if the case involves a cross-race identification, an extremely short
observation time, or a weapon, then the social science relevant to that is the
same in Nebraska as in Nevada. To be sure, it may change and develop
over time, but that is a matter of years, not days or weeks or months. This
modularity and consistency of relevant information over cases is what
makes jury instructions even quasi-thinkable as a method for providing the
fact finder with information about these issues. And it is this same
framework, repeat-play quality that makes modular, premade testimony a
plausible alternative to our traditional, particularized, case-by-case use of an
expert.
Therefore, at a minimum, I wish to argue that we should seriously
consider adding this form of modular testimony to the available tools in our
adjudicatory toolbox. It may (perhaps) be worse than expert testimony in
its traditional live-and-in-person form, but the simple, undeniable reality is
that many defendants never get access to such experts even in cases in
which they are well warranted.
There are, to be sure, many design details that would need to be
worked out and some complexities, practical and doctrinal, that modular
testimony would have to overcome. Some of these are doctrinal—like how
the modules would get around the hearsay rule, or the critical question of
whether prosecutors could legitimately complain about having to accept a
kind of substituted cross-examination in lieu of an opportunity to crossexamine the expert themselves. I would suggest that prosecutors have no
legitimate cause for complaint, considering the symmetry of this proposal:

117. See, e.g., State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 715 (Conn. 2012) (discussing proposed expert
testimony on the impact of stress, time, and police interrogation techniques on the accuracy of
eyewitness identifications); Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766, 773, 791 (Penn. 2014)
(allowing expert testimony offered to show the phenomenon of weapon focus and the impact of
stress and police tactics on eyewitness-identification accuracy); State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103,
1105, 1118 (Utah 2009) (ruling to include expert testimony on factors impacting the accuracy of
eyewitness testimony including “cross-racial identification, the impact of violence and stress
during an event, the tendency to focus on a weapon rather than . . . facial features, and the
suggestive nature of certain identification procedures used by police”).
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while they are required to accept substituted cross-examination, the
defendants are also accepting substituted direct examination. Given that
prosecutors’ rights to cross-examination are rooted in the due process
clause, if the process of creating modules were nonpartisan and fair, why
would due process be violated by this symmetrical reliance on substituted
questioning? In this regard, it is worth noting that with the use of the
social-science based jury instructions in New Jersey, the prosecutor has no
opportunity at all to produce evidence questioning or suggesting limitations
to what the research is said to show118—so substituted cross-examination
would be significantly more informative than that baseline.
Clearly only the defendant could make the preliminary election for the
use of modules because of the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.119
It could be, however, that in some instances a prosecutor would wish to use
a module as rebuttal evidence to show how certain risk-generating variables
were not present in the case. Having elected to make use of modules
herself, a defendant ought not to be able to prevent the prosecutor from
doing the same, at least within the same general topic area. Mechanisms
would have to be developed to make sure the modules were accurate and
fair; one could imagine some kind of vetting of their content or some form
of peer review, in addition to their production by and through organizations
with nonpartisan reputations and substantial authority in the worlds of both
science and law. It would also be appropriate to investigate the effects of
video testimony on juror comprehension as compared with live expert
testimony. Does the technologically mediated nature of the testimony
affect its reception? If so, is it more persuasive or less so?
There are many questions, to be sure. But with vision and effort, there
does not seem to me to be any insurmountable obstacle to producing and
using this form of repeat-play testimony. The key point is that modular
testimony could provide a valuable, ready-to-wear alternative: providing a
practical, affordable, second-best solution to the great bulk of defendants
for whom couture, in the form of the psychological expert hired for the
particular case, is not a viable option.
Albeit tentatively, I might even go one step further. In certain
respects, modular, premade testimony might actually be better than the
traditional kind. Better how? It could certainly be less expensive and more
widely available. In addition, the lawyers who conducted the premade
testimony are likely to be more knowledgeable and more experienced than
many—perhaps even most—of the defense attorneys and prosecutors who
engage with this testimony in the usual way. These are significant
advantages and ought not to be dismissed lightly.
118. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
119. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing the defendant in a criminal prosecution the
right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him”).
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But even beyond these practical benefits, premade testimony for
certain kinds of expert evidence might even be epistemically better—
because through its in-advance, and therefore by necessity generic
structure, modular testimony would limit and cabin the substance of the
expert’s testimony in ways that are harder to achieve with live testimony.
Testimony produced in advance of any given case cannot, by definition,
reach any specific conclusions about that specific case. It can only speak to
the general research findings: what they are, their robustness, their
applicability, and their limits. It can speak hypothetically about some issues
of inference—the degree to which, for example, tests conducted in
laboratory settings may or may not be applicable to the more complex
realities of the messier real world. But an expert is not a soothsayer; the
produced-in-advance testimony designed to educate the fact finder about
the relevant social-science findings cannot possibly answer or address
whether any particular identification, or lineup procedure, or memory, or
confession warrants belief by the fact finder.
To be sure, often psychological experts are very clear about their
inability to make any case-specific judgments—as we saw in the transcript
excerpts above.120 But unsurprisingly, given their roles and their jobs,
attorneys on both sides attempt to push against that boundary. Consider the
following excerpt from a transcript of a psychological expert on eyewitness
identification:

[MR. THERRIEN:] Okay. Let me pose some hypothetical questions
to you.
Suppose a bank robbery takes place, the robber has a gun which he
brandishes and which is clearly visible to all the witnesses.
Immediately after the robbery, the witness to the robbery identifies a
photo of a suspect as the robber. Based on the pictures of the actual
robber from the bank surveillance system, the suspect identified by
the witness doesn’t look very much like the actual robber.
Say a period of time later, say a year later, the witness claims to
remember the robber being a bank customer she knows both by
appearance and by voice[.] What would you conclude about the
reliability of the witness’s second identification, the one of the
known customer?
MS. KIRK: Objection. Invades the province of the jury.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. THERRIEN: Judge, can we be at side bar just for a second.
THE COURT: All right.
120. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
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(AT SIDEBAR:)
MR. THERRIEN: I think an expert can testify as to the information
that he has before him in hypotheticals.
THE COURT: The problem is, in my mind—well, let me hear from
the government.
MS. KIRK: It’s too close to the facts. If it was just—he can testify to
the theories, and they apply the theories to the facts.
THE COURT: The problem that I perceive is you cannot possibly
put in all of the perceptions that were ongoing. For example, the one
lady sitting at a desk looking at the man directly sees a firearm that
looks like, she calls it a revolver. Whether it’s a revolver or pistol,
we don’t know. I also think that it basically is an opinion on guilt or
innocence, or gets awfully close to guilt or innocence, which is a fact
that the trier of fact has to determine.
I also think that you have, at this point, all of the principals of
learning that are available that the jury can use, but to then ask the
hypothetical where he has not seen any of the evidence, or if he has,
it’s been replicated after the event, puts him in a position of
making—providing an opinion which really does invade the
province of the jury. That’s my reaction.
MR. THERRIEN: Okay. Well, I was just—I didn’t ask him about
Michelle Rhode.
THE COURT: No, I know that.
MR. THERRIEN: I was just asking him under that hypothetical. So
I’m not allowed to ask him any hypotheticals?
THE COURT: No, I didn’t say that. But at least that hypothetical
would not be applicable.121
We see here the defense attorney making a valiant effort to ask the
expert about the array of key indicators in the case—as a hypothetical
question—and wanting the expert to opine about reliability on that basis.
The prosecutor and the court both resist this effort to engage in such a
specific, concrete manner. They articulate both that the hypothetical is
incomplete compared to the events itself, and that it also invades the
province of the jury by being too close to the facts—it is at once too
specific and incomplete. The court suggests that what the jury really should
gain from the expert are “principles of learning” rather than this form of
direct opinion on a version of the facts of the case.122 Interestingly, neither
the judge nor prosecutor articulates the argument in the sidebar that, in fact,
the expert lacks adequate expertise to opine on that kind of hypothetical, but

121. Transcript of Record at 23–25, United States v. Gipson, 2008 WL 8762440 (E.D. Wash.
July 23, 2008) (No. CR-07-2056-LRS-1).
122. Id. at 25.
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that argument would have been legitimate as well, since the form that
psychological knowledge about eyewitnesses takes does not permit moving
from the general to the reliability of the individual’s identification on the
basis of the science alone.123
The point is that, as this example suggests, there may sometimes be
pressure on experts to go beyond the realm of the research findings and
what they can legitimately indicate about risk factors. Experts may be
asked—and sometimes may be willing—to opine in a more specific
manner. If we think that experts ought to remain firmly in the framework
setting, offering only meta-expertise without any case-specific commentary,
then modular testimony may even offer advantages compared to traditional
testimony. To whatever extent those limitations on experts are both
valuable and not always easily or completely adhered to under the
adversary pressures and the bustle and immediacy of the trial process, then
modular testimony offers the added benefit of enforcing these limits
through its structural form. Moreover, the fact that modular testimony is,
by necessity, less “tailored” may even enhance its credibility with the fact
finder, because the jury would know the expert was not part of the defense
‘team’.124
Where, then, are we left? In short, if we wish to hew firmly to this
boundary line between the specific and the general, modular, repeat-play
evidence provides a useful method for ensuring experts’—and attorneys’—
adherence. From this perspective, modular testimony may actually be
better than traditional live testimony, precisely because of the way that it
structurally enforces the boundary between the specific and the general.
By contrast, if we believe that experts can and should sometimes offer
more specific evaluations of the applicability of the social science to the
particular case—or the inapplicability of some findings to the specific
case—then modular testimony pales in comparison to the more traditional

123. See Christian Sheehan, Note, Making the Jurors the “Experts”: The Case for Eyewitness
Identification Jury Instructions, 52 B.C. L. REV. 651, 688 (2011) (“A court is especially likely to
disallow an expert’s testimony if it appears that the expert is commenting on the reliability of a
specific witness in the case.”).
124. With modular testimony, the fact finder would presumably understand that the expert
was not a partisan, hired by the specific party, and potentially shading and tailoring his or her
testimony specifically for that particular trial. With the typical expert, not only is there a risk of
partisanship, given adversarial pressures and the dynamics of “team” membership, but there is the
related-but-distinct concern that a jury needs to assess the expert’s partisanship and assess
credibility in light of it. In other words, with case-specific experts, the fact finder must determine
credibility while recognizing that the expert has been hired by a particular party and that his or her
testimony may be affected by this role. With modular testimony, the expert was not hired by any
party in particular. His or her role is more thoroughly that of a social scientist providing
information about relevant research. This lack of case-specific tailoring might make his or her
ready-to-wear testimony more reliable and, perhaps, more credible as well. Thanks to Jaci
Seelagy for helpful discussions on this point.
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form.125 In that case, modular testimony would be a second-best solution,
to be sure, but it would still be far more institutionally appropriate than a
strong judicial reliability test, far more detailed and informative than a set
of jury instructions, and far less costly than a traditional expert.
Whether modular expert evidence is a second best solution or in some
ways an improvement to our traditional approach to experts, the key point is
that either way, it deserves to be taken seriously as a potential tool in our
evidentiary toolbox. The regular use of modular, repeat-play testimony
would expand access to knowledge about the limits of eyewitness
identification and the risk factors for false confessions far beyond the lucky
few who currently get access to live expert witnesses. And, precisely
because it is still testimony, premade modules would provide this
information in a more accurate and thoughtful way than jury instructions
can ever do. There are, to be sure, practical and doctrinal difficulties that
would have to be overcome, but these are only insurmountable if we elect
to be so hidebound that we make them so. It is high time, then, for us to
supplement our current couture approach to expert framework testimony
with a viable ready-to-wear alternative.

125. For example: could an expert legitimately opine that a lineup design was so flawed as to
be unreliable? This might be more legitimate, scientifically, than an opinion that a particular
eyewitness was mistaken. In the former case, the expert would not be opining on the
identification itself from the lineup, but on the legitimacy of the lineup method used given what
the research has shown. This issue may be significant on cross too, where a prosecutor might
want to ask specifically about the factors not present in the given case. Clearly modular testimony
makes this kind of inquiry challenging—though the prosecutor could potentially make the same
point through her own use of modules about the factors that assist reliability combined with
effective use of argument.

